EEAS ONE YEAR ON :
“Work in progress”
for poverty eradication

European NGO confederation for relief and development

Confédération européenne des ONG d’urgence et de développement
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This report is based on research carried out by Rutger Hopster on behalf of Concord, the European Confederation of relief and development NGOs. Using the views of civil society and partner country actors, it looks at progress on development in the context of the EEAS in its first year. The report was written on the basis of desk research and interviews undertaken in the months of October and November 2011.

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There are some positive news stories to tell in relation to the EU’s progress on fighting poverty over the last year. In 2010, the Lisbon Treaty put in place a much strengthened legal basis for development policy, with poverty eradication as its clear and primary purpose. This complements the already existing Development Consensus as signed off by the EU in 2005 and the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has finally united all developing countries under one roof, in an attempt to ensure that development policy applies to all. By placing development under the responsibility of one of the top four diplomats in its senior leadership team, it has made a signal that it will be a priority for the service. There is a new Development Cooperation Division and Development Cooperation Task Force that are getting off their feet. There is also a Human Rights Directorate, which has the potential to ensure a strong human rights perspective to development and to wider EU foreign policy concerns.

Over the course of the last year the Commission has undergone major changes for development, bringing its policy and implementing agencies together under one roof, now called the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO) and reporting to the Development Commissioner. Former development staff on geographic desks have migrated to the External Action Service where their development expertise is used within the new service, whilst, for the moment, still holding the link to the development policy and implementation led by the Commission.

Concord’s experience in 2011 has been on the whole a fairly open door to the EEAS and Commission, to discuss using the institutional reform as an opportunity to improve the record of the EU on poverty eradication. At the same time challenges have arisen, regarding transparency in the division of roles, and accountability towards the European Parliament and Council of Ministers.

While undertaking this one-year review to assess how development has fared within the EU’s new external action set-up, we often heard “too early to tell.” As the EEAS got off the ground, one of its officials compared the new service to a car being driven during the day, and fixed at night – in the dark. However, certain tendencies emerging from our review are important to signal particularly as the EU prepares to agree its 2014-20 policy and spending priorities and instruments.

As our report recalls, development is the only policy to straddle the EEAS and the Commission. Earlier “silos” between security, human rights, and development are starting to break down, impelled by a healthy soul-searching in the wake of the Arab Spring. However the balance is wavering between – more often – policies mainly in the EU’s short-term interests, and those in the best longer-term interests of developing countries and their poor and marginalised communities.

These trade-offs are compounded by the lack of high-level recognition of a role for the EEAS in the Lisbon Treaty obligation to ensure the EU’s external action doesn’t undermine its development objectives. In EU Delegations, paradoxically the silos between political and development cooperation staff have at least temporarily increased. Delegations are therefore not yet able to serve the potential of the EU’s institutional reforms to position development objectives more centrally within a more robust EU external action. But for those in developing countries facing extreme poverty and denial of their human rights, time is pressing.

Concord is highly supportive of the Lisbon Treaty and its strong commitments to put fighting poverty back at the centre of development policy. We want to see the EU applying the letter of the Treaty by adopting equitable policies that tackle the causes and symptoms of poverty, inequality and conflict at their root, enabling poor countries to develop in ways that are economically, socially and environmentally sustainable.

Concord’s vision for the EEAS, as outlined in our January 2011 paper, is one of a service that strives to establish rights- and values-based foreign policies and fair and mutually beneficial cooperation with developing countries first and foremost. It should also prioritise and mainstream long-term conflict prevention across the EU regional strategies to ensure a meaningful contribution to stability and sustainable development.
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **MAKE PCD A REALITY:**

   The High Representative should acknowledge her role in making Policy Coherence for Development a reality through the EEAS, particularly its delegations. She should make a statement setting PCD as a clear priority for the service, explaining clearly to staff their role in relation to PCD when developing regional and national strategy papers. The Agenda for Change marks a great opportunity for the EEAS and DEVCO to clarify what mechanisms they will put in place and how they will work together to ensure real policy coherence - with emphasis on development - becomes a reality.

2. **CLARIFY ROLES ON PROGRAMMING:**

   In the interest of transparency and accountability, the EEAS and DEVCO should complete and publicise the Memorandum of Understanding on how they will divide tasks and responsibilities for development. The MoU should cover both the approach to the programming of funds as well as PCD, cooperation in-country, joint programming and in-country consultation processes. The scrutiny role of the European Parliament on external instruments programming should also be maintained and this needs to be clarified. Programming guidelines should clearly establish the roles of the different actors and should properly integrate the principles of ownership, alignment, joint programming and multi-stakeholder consultation including civil society.

3. **DEVELOP A CLEAR NARRATIVE ON DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION**

   The EEAS should develop a narrative on EU development cooperation and its interaction with security and human rights policies. Under its watch, no further erosion of the civilian character of development cooperation through military or quasi-military spending should take place. It should work with the Commission to develop a more informed and wide-angle view of EU long-term development objectives, which have poverty eradication as their end goal. The High Representative should state her vision of the EU’s role in development that is grounded in the achievement of human rights, tackling inequality and gender equality. This narrative should respect the Lisbon Treaty. It should also be shared with the EP Development Committee and Council, which will need to support the vision in the years to come.

4. **SHARPEN YOUR DEVELOPMENT EXPERTISE**

   Expertise on development policy and practice must be present at all levels in the institutions, including the EEAS. The EEAS and DEVCO should develop a training programme for all new EEAS staff to ensure their ability to understand and apply a rights based approach to development issues, including PCD. The EEAS and DEVCO should develop an overall and coherent policy on the role of staff at delegation level, including clarity on reporting lines.

5. **SEIZE THE DAY: WORK WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN COUNTRY**

   At the delegation level, both the EEAS and DEVCO should work more actively to engage in political and policy dialogue with stakeholders including CSOs and NGOs, who know the context of human rights and poverty on the ground and can help to shape strategies to tackle it. This will ensure that the programming for the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework have a strong in-country basis and a proper reality check. A key consideration here is to give ample time to allow for comprehensive in-country consultation.
‘EARLIER “SILOS” BETWEEN SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DEVELOPMENT ARE STARTING TO BREAK DOWN...
HOWEVER THE BALANCE IS WAVERING BETWEEN POLICIES MAINLY IN THE EU’S SHORT-TERM INTERESTS, AND THOSE IN THE BEST LONGER-TERM INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ (AND THEIR POOR AND MARGINALISED COMMUNITIES).
There is a lack of shared understanding on policy coherence for development between the Commission and the EEAS.
The Lisbon Treaty states that the EU shall contribute to the eradication of poverty in its relations with the wider world (article 3, TEU), whilst placing poverty eradication as the primary aim of it development policy (article 208, TFEU) as well as a consideration for all other policies. Organisationally, a compromise was implemented on development cooperation: strategic programming of funds went to the EEAS, albeit under the authority of the Commissioner. Development policy and implementation remained squarely with the Commission. This makes development the only policy area of work dealt with by both and not a great deal of clarity as to who has the ultimate say on programming.

The EEAS started on 1 January 2011, after a year of negotiations between Commission, Council and European Parliament. With the establishment of the Service, Commission delegations in the field became EU delegations. Most Commission and Council staff followed their jobs into the EEAS. This meant continuity of political desk work, important for partner countries, though there was more disruption for newly created directorates and departments. The EEAS is now bedding down even if changes in merging EU staff with seconded diplomats has had a bigger impact on working methods than people had anticipated. This is particularly felt in the area of development, with the simultaneous dismantling of DG Development, the weakening of certain development positions and the severing of the link between political and cooperation relations.

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Still, the EEAS is a work in progress. Changes are being implemented against an unpredictable backdrop of economic and financial crisis and unrest on the doorstep of Europe in the form of the Arab Spring. Even without these challenges, the EEAS and the HR have difficult jobs to perform. The HR is not only responsible for shaping a new organisation, she also has to design her own new role against a combination of agreed FAC policies and her own Commission responsibilities. Her job description was from the outset considered to be over-ambitious. She is Vice-President of the Commission, chair of the FAC and the Development FAC and High Representative and head of the EEAS. This said, several interviewees thought her interpretation of her role was more towards the member states than towards the Union. This has arisen particularly in relation to EEAS and Commission staff participating in Council working groups. Several interviewees felt the EEAS was taking sides with Member States rather than with community interests. This may negatively impact EU development policies in the longer term.

A CLIMATE OF CHANGE

Even if many Commission staff simply saw their jobs moved to the EEAS, changes have been noticeable at EEAS middle and top management levels with national diplomats taking on jobs after 1 January and with newly formed geographical and thematic directorates. Several interviewees highlighted the difference in outlook of staff and management, with the latter having a stronger political outlook, and being more foreign policy driven. Several also mentioned the lack of vision on EU-ACP relations, beyond the individual regions, and a general lack of vision on development issues and policy coherence for development.

However, the EEAS also has led to gains for development: there is now an EEAS corporate board member with responsibility for development: this is a voice for development at the top table of day-to-day management of the EU’s foreign relations. The HR has committed to a formal annual exchange on development issues with the European Parliament. All development cooperation staff both in delegation and in Brussels are now integrated in one body (DEVCO), led by the Development Commissioner.

WHAT ABOUT THE CHANGES IN COUNTRY?

A number of partner countries recognise the positive impact of the EEAS on in-country dialogue, especially with partner governments. Feedback suggests that in-country there is clarity on the simplified lines of reporting: a diplomatic one and a cooperation one. However, NGOs have not seen a difference in engagement with them. Also, there seems to be a delay in providing comprehensive instructions to EU delegations, on how to engage with third parties in the new set-up. No comprehensive instructions on development for both cooperation and EEAS staff have been sent out as of yet. Delegations seem to be in waiting mode. In the new set up delegations should strengthen their consultation processes with civil society and non-state actors. How long will civil society have to wait?

CHANGING ROLES STILL REQUIRE CLARIFICATION

At the moment, there seems to be a prevailing wind of competition rather than cooperation between the EEAS and DEVCO. Clearly there is a need to develop shared responsibilities in the area of development, whilst retaining the individual strengths of the EEAS and DEVCO. This was the essence of the compromise reached on programming in 2010.

The EEAS and DEVCO still need to conclude on an MoU and publish the key elements of it. Citizens, NGOs and partner countries should know how in future programming documents are drafted and agreed prior to agreement. This will greatly enhance transparency. Haiti is an example of where a general lack of visibility can lead to a lack of transparency. The CSP was adapted following the earthquake, but it is now unclear what role the EEAS plays in taking issues forward both in-country (in the interim reconstruction committee) and in Brussels: who leads on the reconstruction effort: EEAS or DEVCO?
The top 3 in the EEAS.
Left, Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General,
Centre, Catherine Ashton, High Representative,
Right, David O’Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer

The High Representative at the Paris Summit for
the support to Libyan people, 2011
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS:
THE EEAS PROMOTING FAIR POLICIES

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is a treaty obligation. Article 208 implies that all EU policies must be in support of partner countries’ development needs, or at least not contradict the aim of poverty eradication. Together with EU development policies and effective aid, PCD can have a significant impact on sustainable development. So far the EU has largely lacked political will on PCD. The Commission refers to the role played by impact assessments in ensuring PCD. However a recent study by Concord Denmark showed that of 77 impact assessments with relevance to developing countries, 7 actually analysed the potential impact on those countries. With the EEAS, the EU has created a structure that should ensure more consistency in EU external actions and between the EU and the member states. But will this coherence extend to the impact of EU internal and external policies on development objectives as foreseen in the Treaty?

Whereas country and regional strategising as well as responsibility for political dialogue in country have moved to the EEAS, there has been no corresponding transfer of responsibility for PCD. At the moment there is a risk that the EEAS will focus on EU external policy coherence only and not play itspart in making genuine PCD a reality.

PCD involves input from member states, Commission, EEAS and delegations on the ground. Although DEVCO is and should be responsible for coordinating on PCD, the ultimate responsibility for PCD lies with the President of the European Commission as the Guardian of the Treaties. Only he can help to support the Development Commissioner in calling other DGs to account on the policies they are bringing forward, through interservice consultations and calling for robust impact assessments. But there is also a role for the HR as head of the EEAS and Vice-President of the Commission.

The EEAS must ensure that the political dialogue for third countries, for which its delegations are responsible, facilitate discussion of the impact of EU policies on those countries. Delegations are most likely to see and hear first about the effect of conflicting EU policies. Are they set up to take this on?

Second, the EEAS should act as a means of taking on complaints from citizens of third countries with regards to the EU’s duty to PCD. It would then be tasked with channelling this information through to an external relations ombudsman responsible for taking action on complaints. To this end, the EEAS would primarily act as an interlocutor with citizens in partner countries locally and an intermediary between them and the EU institutions.

Broadly speaking there is still a lack of clarity as to which role the EEAS should be playing. Several institutional interviewees mentioned (external) policy consistency as the EEAS’ role, not PCD. With an unclear mandate, no capacity has been allocated to PCD within the EEAS.

The question which must be asked is whether the EEAS is there to defend Europe’s best interests or to defend those of the partner countries. This may define its willingness to move on PCD. In the old set up, DG Development’s role was much more aligned with partner countries’ best interests. The impact of this apparent change of approach should not be underestimated.

Where could the EEAS and delegations contribute on PCD? Three examples where policies require more than mere technical coordination through DEVCO: food security; renewable energy and migration. The EU must demonstrate greater efforts to make PCD an operational element of its Common Agricultural Policy. The 10% renewable energy for transport target of the EU poses challenges to development objectives. And the current restrictive approach to EU migration policy lacks consideration for development implications and human rights requirements. This is shown now through the EU’s reaction to migration flows from Tunisia and Libya.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY

There are few signs that development is seen as a priority for the EEAS. This could make EU objectives of poverty eradication and PCD more difficult to achieve. Despite EU policy documents showing a growing interest in the link between development and security, the EEAS does not (yet) seem to have clear views on development and how development
objectives should interact with security (including piracy) and human rights issues.

In a recent EEAS speech on EU-Africa relations in Somalia is given as an example of the EU’s new foreign policy: combating piracy through the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, funding the AU peace-keeping force AMISOM, and working with the UN to promote inclusive local political negotiations through capacity building for the transitional federal government. These three strands may show a comprehensive answer from an EU perspective to Horn of Africa issues, but reflect today’s issues, not a longer term a sustainable development approach. The EEAS should seek to incorporate long-term development objectives in its policy dialogue with third countries and in its CFSP policies and should work on the basis of dialogue and partnership, not on the basis of an agenda and policies developed by the EU alone.

The link between security and development should inform future EU strategies and policies. In this context, the EEAS and DEVCO need to define distinct responsibilities and roles on development and security. Within this, they should address the link between humanitarian aid and longer term development (LRRD) as well as conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction.

The EEAS should work towards more detail on the development perspective of security challenges, dialogue processes, climate change, environmental and natural resource management issues and migration, as well as aspects related to (investment) financing. It should do this jointly with DEVCO. On migration from unstable countries, for instance, this should not purely be seen as a security threat but also as a survival strategy of people.

A more informed development view will also help the HR keep development on the broader EU (external relations) agenda. A few statistics: since the start of the EEAS, the HR has made more than 270 statements on external action. Of those, only 24 were on Africa, albeit mainly on election issues. No statements were made either on behalf of the EU or on external action, covering poverty eradication, sustainable development or other general policy coherence for development issues. The HR has given around 30 speeches, none of them on poverty, policy coherence, or ODA. This despite the fact that she chairs the Development FAC and the European Council now discusses annually EU ODA levels. The point here is not to see the HR begin adding the words development and poverty eradication blandly to her speeches. However if she is to take on responsibility for programming, even in part, she will need to acknowledge her role in development and ensure that she allocates time to pursuing the EU’s goals with regard to it.

Before the Horn of Africa strategy, the first joint EC-EEAS paper was on the Sahel, dated March 2011. It provides a similar example on how internal EU security and anti-terrorism concerns may influence the way EU development cooperation and funding will be targeted in the future. The linking of security and development agendas could be a step towards more coherent EU external action, but could also be seen as increased securitisation of development. Both the analytical and programming parts of the strategy focus exclusively on security issues and again show limited detail on the broader context of development challenges and economic and political cooperation. The strategy is mainly based on EU’s expectations.

It is too early days to qualify the two strategies, the speeches and the Agenda for Change as a trend. However a more informed view on the interaction between long term development and security issues inside the EEAS may help shape the external consistency which the EU is trying to achieve with the EEAS, without impeding the distinct responsibility of the Development Commissioner and DEVCO.

**PROGRAMMING OF FUNDS**

Preparations for the next ‘financial perspective’ from 2014-2020 have just started. Within this, the funding envelope for development and how this is spent will be key questions. EDF spending and modalities follow similar processes, but remain outside the EU budget.

The present instruments were introduced in 2007 and most funds were programmed prior to the existence of the EEAS. In the agreement on the establishment of the EEAS, the lead for strategic programming of funds (country and regional envelopes and sector spending) was given to the EEAS, with preparatory work done under the responsibility of the Development Commissioner. Both he and the HR have to agree to any proposal. Programme and project work (identification and implementation) remain with the Commission.

The European Parliament has sought to clarify this compromise approach. The HR set out principles in July 2010 on how the services would work together: the Development Commissioner ensures that development principles and objectives are streamlined into programming. Principle responsibility for programming lies with the Development Commissioner (even if the EEAS are in the lead for the first three steps of the process). EEAS staff will work with Commission staff. As before, the details of this cooperation are still to be worked out in an MoU, which was expected last Spring after the merger of DG Development and AidCo into DEVCO. This MoU on division of labour will be all the more important as of next year when EEAS and Commission staff actually have to work together to finalise the instruments, agree funding envelopes and programming guidelines.

The first drafts of the new instruments are now being discussed between services in the Commission with co-responsibility for the EEAS. Preparatory work seems to have been done in cooperation. The main outline of the instruments will stay the same, but cooperation priorities will be aligned with the Agenda for Change. The Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised and High Income Countries (ICI) will double in size and being shaped into a Partnership Instrument aiming at supporting EU interests abroad and addressing major global challenges. The second proposed change is more flexibility between the instruments and within the instruments, and a simplification of the country programming process with the view of facilitating joint programming with member states.
The strength (or weakness) of the new institutional set up will become clearer with the programming of funds. This will also show whether the new and more flexible approach will lead to more short-term objectives and a furthering of the EU’s own political interests. This is a big uncertainty for partner countries.

It is not yet clear who or how the programming guidelines are going to be issued, though the Commission is working on a schedule. In the meantime, delegations are in waiting mode. The EEAS and DEVCO will also have a challenge ahead of them in deciding how to deal with programming guideline instructions in different contexts (e.g. with countries who have graduated to a different type of partnerships under the new differentiation policy).

One thing is clear: the EEAS review in 2012 should look at how the Financial Regulation can be adapted to respond better to the needs of delegations to ensure speed and consistency in development aid disbursements. Overall, DEVCO remains poorly equipped on technical issues, with too much reliance on seconded national experts.

**THE ISSUE OF EXPERTISE**

Concord’s vision on how to ensure that programming is managed well by the new institutional structure is to ensure that expertise on development policy and practice is present at all levels in the institutions, including the EEAS. Delegations have thus far not seen any changes in the way they will deal with programming. However, it is not yet clear whether the EEAS in Brussels will have the ability to support and guide delegations on programming, how they intend to shape their role next to DEVCO, and how the programmes and strategies will be taken through management committees by the EEAS. The Development Unit in the EEAS has 11 staff and prepares Development FACs, functions as a development contact point and should coordinate programming guidelines for around €11 billion of spending per year. The unit will also have to take joint programming with member states forward, which will be a key task to alleviate pressure on partner countries and streamline processes. The Africa directorate in the EEAS has only one person working on horizontal programming issues.

Training is a further area which needs to be addressed. EEAS and DEVCO should build a strong training plan for new staff giving them an understanding of a human rights based approach to development, policy coherence for development, aid effectiveness commitments, aid modalities, the partnership approach of Cotonou, as well as the key EU policy documents. DEVCO needs to develop a comprehensive staffing policy building on their new responsibility for development staff in EU delegations. They need a policy that allows staff to rotate easily between DEVCO, the EEAS and its delegations depending on need, whilst building up development expertise.

Expertise to programme and engage with local stakeholders should also be strengthened and delegations should be guided on the basis of the outcome of the structured dialogue. EEAS staff should participate in follow-up of the structured dialogue and in the implementation of the recommendations agreed during that dialogue process. This would help build engagement with CSOs and NGOs. The experience of the Ninth EDF programming for Senegal can serve as a good best practice example: it was done on the basis of genuine facilitation of discussion. It led to the establishment of the local CSO platform, which is still functioning today.
CONCLUSIONS

1. It is genuinely early days to see the impact of the EEAS in terms of development. It has been operational for only one year. However, the EEAS would already seem to be interpreting its role more to respond to member states than to defend the interests of the Union. This ‘intergovernmental’ approach could negatively impact future development strategies. The impact on development objectives of integrating national diplomats in the new set up is yet to be fully seen. The EEAS is in its infancy and has so far insufficiently engaged with stakeholders beyond partner governments.

2. The EEAS has not acknowledged or clarified its role in development vis a vis the Commission. The political agreement of 2010 left certain room for interpretation. That situation needs to be clarified with a clear statement from Mrs Ashton on the importance of development policy within her service.

3. Development stakeholders need to know and understand who they should engage with in the EEAS. In Brussels there is a risk that the EEAS, serving Commission and Member States and with part responsibility for development spending, may obfuscate the delineation of responsibilities: stakeholders, especially in the area of development, may not know who to turn to. This may reduce the potential of the EEAS and Commission to draw upon the important inputs of development stakeholders who are unclear on how to engage.

4. There is an apparent disconnect between the formal and informal Development Councils of the EU. One is chaired by the HR and the other by the rotating presidency. This may lead to inconsistencies and reduced accountability towards the European Parliament and other stakeholders. In particular, if Ashton does not prioritise development overall, we may see a marginalisation of development as an issue in Council meetings. The EEAS and High Representative should ensure that the EP remains properly informed of and involved in development issues being discussed at EU level.

5. There is a lack of shared understanding on Policy Coherence for Development between the Commission and the EEAS. In particular the ‘D’ in PCD is not being acknowledged by the EEAS, which interprets its as an effort to ensure consistency of EU policies with a foreign affairs agenda. PCD must be clearly understood and applied by the leadership and staff of the EEAS and Commission as ensuring that all EU policies – internal and external – are coherent with its development policy objectives.

6. Furthermore the EEAS is not acknowledging its legal responsibility as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty for PCD. To date it would not even appear to be engaging in discussions with the Commission as to how responsibilities for should be divided. Crucially there is no clear mechanism for the EEAS and DEVCO to ensure that PCD is achieved. Overall the opportunity represented by institutional reform to further the PCD agenda has not been grasped.

7. It is too early to say whether the prioritisation of security within the EU foreign policy agenda will have negative implications for development. But overall the EEAS would not appear to have an integrated vision which reflects its revised competencies. The comprehensive strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel are clearly dominated by EU security interest analyses with limited long-term human development concerns. This does not necessarily mean that the human development of these regions has been forgotten by the EU, but it is a situation which will need to be monitored.
Development is the only area of work of the EU that straddles both the EEAS and Commission. Without an agreed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the EEAS and DEVCO, it is difficult to say how labour will be divided in terms of the programming of funds and policy coherence for development. Stakeholders, partner countries and NGOs want to see an MoU with provisions built in to guarantee democratic ownership, participation and partnership in development cooperation, with poverty eradication as its core objective. The MoU should further clarify on who leads and who facilitates, an issue which was not resolved with the political agreement of July 2010. In particular, a clear hand over mechanism from EEAS to Commission will be important to help countries achieve long-term development goals in the aftermath of crises.

At country level, EEAS and DEVCO staff project different messages. Thus far, there is no comprehensive development training for staff nor a staff policy. One year on, it is important that all EEAS and delegation staff have a shared and consistent understanding of EU development policies and how they need to be implemented in country. DEVCO faces a unique challenge in taking on personnel responsibilities for all development staff in delegations and integrating them with Brussels based staff. It will allow in future for a more coherent development profile in the Commission with staff rotating to delegations depending on expertise and need. This could in the end be to the benefit of partner countries.
LIST OF ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

Civil Society
PASCiB, NGO platform Benin
NGO umbrella organisation Rwanda
National NGO network Burundi
National NGO network, DRC
National NGO network, UK (Bond)
ActionAid
Aprodev
World Vision

EU Institutions
DG DEVCO
DG DEVCO (East and Southern Africa)
EEAS, Development Division
EEAS, Tanzania
EEAS (Americas)
EEAS (Horn of Africa and East Africa and Indian Ocean)
Government of France
Government of Germany
Government of Guyana
European Parliament, DEVE secretariat

Think tanks
ODI

Media
European Voice

ABBREVIATIONS

ACP
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
CFSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy
CODEV
Council Development Working Group
CSO
Civil Society Organisation
DCI
Development Cooperation Instrument
DG
Directorate General (of the Commission)
DEVCO DG
Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid
DEVE
European Parliament Development Committee
EC
European Commission
EDF
European Development Fund
EEAS
European External Action Service

PHOTOS CREDITS:

European Commission, EuropeAid Multimedia library
European Council, photographic library
European delegations photo library : Burkina Faso, Zambia

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CONCORD a.i.s.b.l.: 10 square Ambiorix - 1000 Brussels, Belgium - Tel: +32 2 743 87 60 - Fax: +32 2 732 19 34.

www.concordeurope.org